Guest Column by Muncel Chang, Department of Geography, Butte College (California)
Dateline: 11/07/00
Throughout human history the control of Earth's surface has largely focused on land - real estate or actual property ranging in area from small agricultural plots to enormous imperial regions. Control of the seas, on the other hand, was tenuous at best. Prior to the electronic age, such control was limited to the times that the controlling power was actually present in any particular region of the oceans. In addition, this control was often limited to "line-of-sight." Still a naval presence was not entirely necessary all of the time. Fear of or respect for the dictates of the power in control was often enough to maintain reasonable jurisdiction over the claimed region. During the Elizabethan Age, for example, the mere thought of having Sir Francis Drake and the Golden Hinde appear over the horizon was enough to keep many a ship from sailing into some parts of the Seven Seas.
The control of the oceans at the end of the 20th century is regulated by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention that went into effect in 1994. This law defines oceanic jurisdiction for all nations. It establishes the principle of a 200-nautical-mile limit on a nation's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) whereby a nation controls the undersea resources, primarily fishing and seabed mining, for a distance of 200 nautical miles from shore. This has given some formerly obscure and poor nations enormous potential for wealth. The island nation of New Zealand, for example, now controls an ocean area seven times its land area. The South Pacific island nation of Kiribati (pronounced "key-ree-bas") has a land area of 280.24 square miles. It controls an EEZ of 1,370,300 square miles or an astounding 4,890 times its land area! One of the key areas in the world currently in dispute is the Spratly Islands located in the South China Sea. To fully understand and appreciate the background of this area, one should examine some of the history and culture of the region especially in relation to China's claims and influence.
As technology in the West increased during the Renaissance so did curiosity about the world. With it came visions of wealth and power. Voyages by Prince Henry the Navigator, Vasco da Gama, and Christopher Columbus resulted in claims to land and sea along the coast of west Africa, the Caribbean, and South America. The Treaty of Tordesillas in 1492 that divided the the control of the New World between Spain and Portugal, lent the authority of the Church to the legitimacy of these claims in that region. But Church authority was neither respected nor binding upon those who chose to ignore it. What followed during the next four hundred years was a "scramble for empire" and the establishment of European colonies on five continents.
During this same period, the civilization of China was virtually unknown in the West. The 13th century adventures of Marco Polo fired the imaginations and desires of many Europeans, but the major trade routes to the East led overland. These routes passed through many exotic places. Products carried along the "Silk Road" changed hands often and many of the trade items originated in far away places other than China. Nonetheless, China was still the ultimate prize to be obtained.
Even before the Europeans "discovered" China, the Chinese were very much involved in their own voyages of exploration although their underlying motivation and purpose were diametrically opposed to those of the Europeans. China considered itself to be the perfect civilization under Heaven. Indeed it looked upon itself as the only perfect state on the planet. Being perfect meant not wanting or needing anything. In 1409, Emperor Yung Lo moved his seat of power from Nanjing (Nanking) northward to Beijing (Peking). By 1421, the move to the new capital at Beijing had been completed with the "Forbidden City" of palaces, gardens, and artificial lakes at its center.
To proclaim the splendor and greatness of China Yung Lo sent out a series of seven naval expeditions during the years from 1405 to 1433 to the South China Sea and the lands surrounding the Indian Ocean. Placed in charge of these expeditions was a little-known court eunuch named Chêng Ho. Not much is known about Chêng Ho except that he was born a Muslim and was probably from a peasant family in the southern province of Yunnan that borders on northeastern Myanmar (Burma). Court eunuchs were often part of the scholarly class who were very knowledgeable in the philosophy of Confucius. They had access to the inner circle of the royal court and were often called upon for advice on all matters of state. Their power and influence often held sway. Although there is no evidence for it, Chêng Ho may have been part of this scholarly class. He was undoubtedly a very influential and commanding person who knew much about the physical and cultural world outside of China.
Chêng Ho's expeditions consisted of fleets with as many as 317 ships carrying more than 37,000 crewmen. Various classes of ships made up these voyages - Treasure Ship, Horse Ship, Supply Ship, Billet Ship, Combat Ship. The largest carried nine masts and had a length of 444 feet and a beam of 180 feet. Those who had seen these ships marveled at their size for they exceeded anything seen in Europe or in any other part of the world.
There is ample evidence to show that Chêng Ho knew exactly where he was going and what he would encounter. The Chinese had been trading with the Arab world since the T'ang Dynasty in the early Middle Ages and Chinese sailing ships had been visitors to these regions long before that. Maps and navigational charts taken on these voyages were of regions ranging from the South China Sea to all places bordering on the Indian Ocean including India and east Africa. Further evidence of prior Chinese knowledge about that part of the world comes from the fact that the interpreters who accompanied these voyages already knew the languages of the lands being visited.
As stated earlier, the contrast between the purposes of the Chinese and those of the Europeans could not have been greater. The establishment of colonies and the seeking of fortune in slaves, gold, or trade were not even considered by the Chinese. China wanted nothing because China needed nothing. The possession of colonies would have been an admission of not being truly self-sufficient or self-reliant. In addition, the Celestial Empire viewed itself as the only truly civilized society on Earth. Why then should China be burdened with colonies that were not civilized? And why should China run the risk having any aspect of its society at home negatively influenced by ideas from inferior places?
Instead the Chinese voyages were undertaken to make the outside world aware of the greatness of China. They were designed to elicit admiration. The overwhelming size and grandeur of the fleet were not to instill fear but to evoke awe. Those who came in contact with the Chinese considered it a privilege to pay homage in presenting all manner of gifts to the Chinese. Chinas polite acceptance of such tribute was done for the purpose of acknowledging an inferiors recognition of China's superiority. Tribute was not accepted because of need despite the fact that many of the gifts represented items that were unknown to the Chinese. Voluntary tribute during this period was in stark contrast to the persecution and plunder of European "discoverers" whose actions provided ample evidence in support of a truly uncivilized people in the West.
The Chinese have always been enchanted with fanciful and even mythological creatures. Dragons, for example, still prevail not only in the imagination but in many aspects of cultural life and design. The year 2000, for example, is the Year of the Dragon. As early as the first century A.D. when a live rhinoceros was delivered to the capital at Xi'an (Ch'ang-an), China has been fascinated with the wondrous creatures of the universe. These animals were perceived as having resulted from the surplus energy of the cosmos. As such they possess special powers and are looked upon as favorable omens of good fortune and creativity from Heaven. In 1414, a giraffe appeared as tribute from Bengal. This remarkable animal created a sensation. To the Chinese it confirmed their beliefs that virtue under Heaven was theirs. Contact with the King of Malindi on the coast of present-day Kenya in 1415 produced another giraffe along with a new tributary state. What followed were other spectacular animals for the royal zoo that had never before been seen - lions, tigers, ostriches, zebras, oryxes, etc.
The appearance of these animals were viewed as the physical reality of Chinese folklore and legend. One can only imagine the excitement of finding that such animals actually existed. These animals represented the mysteries and secrets of cosmic design. Understanding this helps one to comprehend the importance the Chinese place upon form, color, design, and spatial relationships and the fascination with exotic medicines and foods. It is no accident that the powdered horn of a rhinoceros is a highly valued aphrodisiac. Ascribed to it are the creative powers of the universe. Wisdom, long life, prosperity, health, energy, and all the successful attributes of existence are found in the increasingly rare bounties of nature. Thus the bones of the tiger, the gall bladders of the bear, and the fins of a shark all hold the keys to the mysteries of life. To the dismay of environmentalists, this fascination and belief continues today.
Although tribute was not demanded or exacted from foreign places, it was expected. The price that the Chinese paid to gain admiration was very high. In attempting to create the appearance of greatness, the Chinese gave the finest products in return for nothing. And giving was not done in the manner of distributing "beads and blankets" as found among European and American explorers, fur traders, and missionaries. "It is more blessed to give than to receive" was put into practical action even though giving finished products of silks, gold, porcelain, lacquers, woods, and precious stones of the highest quality cost them dearly.
Unlike European nations, religious proselytizing was never done by the Chinese. By contrast, efforts were made to support local religions. The objective of the Chinese was to exhibit its generosity, superior culture, and wealth and to show the magnificence of the Ming Dynasty. China's generosity through Chêng Ho achieved the desired result. Tributary "gifts" from any of these visited places were no match in value for what China provided to these states. In fact, tribute represented an acknowledgment that the Celestial Empire was indeed the only true and civilized power on Earth. While this generosity on the part of tributary states was to promote an international feeling of good will, it would in later years become one of corruption and destabilization. Giving eventually resulted in a negative balance of trade and in a lack of established colonies or trading ports in the Western European manner.
In contrast to the Chinese practices, the Portuguese, Dutch, and English evoked fear through forced conversion and detestable mutilation. Their gifts were death and disease with a few colorful beads thrown in. The behavior of the Western European "Christian" nations during and after the Age of Exploration left no doubt with many "remote regions" as to which part of the world was more attuned to honor, wisdom, and human rights. To this day, that impression remains, reflecting the view that the primary tenets of Christianity are centered on "greed" and "self-interest." This in turn is directly linked to "capitalism," "free-market economies," and "democracy." This is not to say that regional tyrants have done any better. One has only to look at the medieval Genghis Khan, Cambodia's Pol Pot in the late 1970s, or countless other examples at any historical period to understand that greed, cruelty, and inhumanity are traits which can take root anywhere among any group. In addition, the present Chinese occupation of Tibet flies in the face of many of their ancient values. Nonetheless, it should not come as any surprise when the Chinese today oppose any international complaints about their so-called human rights violations against dissidents.
The voyages and contacts of Chêng Ho continued to be supported by the royal court until 1433. With the transfer of the national capital to Peking (Beijing) in 1421, it was clear that China's national interest and economy could not afford such "benevolent" activities of what amounted to an expensive public relations campaign. Three imperial edicts were issued in 1433, 1449, and 1452. These new laws halted all further voyages and imposed increasingly harsher penalties on those who violated them. Government concern focused on internal problems and needed infrastructure projects - the completion of the Grand Canal, flood control, irrigation and water conservation developments, grain storage, and internal communications. The banning of seafaring vessels was accompanied by a decline in ocean trade and all jobs, industries, and even ports connected with it. Building a seaworthy junk with more than two masts was punishable by death and in 1525 all such junks were ordered destroyed. Espionage was redefined in 1551 to include anyone who went to sea in a multi-masted ship. China's self-imposed isolation returned and contact with the outside world was cut off.
This reversion to isolation resulted in some interesting consequences during the waning years of the 20th century. Placing this historical background into the context of the 1990s helps to understand China's position with respect to the various national claims on the Spratly Islands. These islands in the South China Sea are no more than a series of rocks scattered in a shallow region southwest of the Philippines and east of Vietnam. Not much thought was given to these islands over the centuries. Their size was insignificant and they were generally considered to be a hazard by the larger seafaring nations. The recent discoveries of large deposits of oil beneath them promoted their status from "worthless" to "extremely desirable."
The Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 declares that an island is "a naturally-formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide." "Rocks" are excluded from this definition of an "island," but are included in another paragraph. "Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf." Such rocks may still have a 12-mile territorial sea including a contiguous zone (24-mile limited jurisdictional zone). There are a number of loopholes and open questions that have not yet been addressed. For example, if a "rock" is converted by enlargement and technology to support human habitation or to have an economic life of its own, is it then eligible to be re-classified as an "island?" It is not inconceivable to establish a producing well on a rock, build up a self-contained drilling platform complete with a hot-house or hydroponic facility, a desalination plant, and a solar-derived energy installation and call it an economically viable island. Any such outrageous or ridiculous-appearing measures being taken by claimant countries to "develop" a rock thus take on a whole new meaning. As an example fairly close to home, one might take a look at White, Chaffe, and Grissom Islands sitting just off-shore in Long Beach harbor. These are sophisticated oil drilling platforms in the guise of islands complete with palm trees and "high-rise buildings."
The South China Sea encompasses some 894,748 square miles (see the comparative chart at the end). Some areas are very deep; the maximum depth is a little over 18,000 feet. Many areas are very shallow and marked with coral reefs. This region is subject to seasonal monsoons: the summer monsoon of June and July blowing from the south and the winter monsoon of December and January blowing from the north. Accompanying storms can be very powerful and shipping in this region is always subject to potential disaster. The Spratly Islands lie approximately 600 nautical miles from the closest Chinese territory - Hainan Dao. That is 400 nautical miles outside China's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
China is among the six nations claiming the Spratlys as its territory. Because they are physically closer, the five other nations - the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan - have a much better claim on the Spratlys. Although the Spratlys are a long way from China, the Chinese claim is based upon historical data indicating "prior occupation." Zhu De-xiang, from the Institute of Geography at the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing, begins his article on this issue with, "The Nansha Islands (the Chinese name for the Spratlys) are the most southern territories of China." The Chinese view is not a statement of disputed claim, but a statement of fact. He traces the historical influence in this region back to 214 B.C. Recent archeological investigations and historical records indicate that Chinese fishermen have utilized these islands and the seas around them since the Han Dynasty (around 100 B.C.). The Chinese military encountered the islands as early as 43 A.D. Since that time there have been numerous references to these islands by the Chinese whose voyages of trade and exploration passed through the South China Sea. In more recent times, there is firm evidence that Chinese fisherman established residence on some of the larger islands prior to the mid-1800s. In the late 1800s and again in 1933 they planted coconut trees on several of the islands. Additionally, plantings of bananas, pineapples, and pumpkins were done in 1933.
Although the Chinese have participated in a number of regional conferences on the issue of the Spratlys and jurisdiction in the South China Sea, they have not chosen to submit their claims and views to the World Court. There have been several incidents that indicate China's willing to pursue a different course. In 1974, a South Vietnamese garrison on the Paracel Islands between Hainan Dao and the Spratly Islands was defeated by the Chinese air and naval forces. Then in 1988 the Chinese sank three Vietnam transport ships killing seventy-two. In 1992 China escalated tensions in the region by declaring sovereignty over most of the South China Sea. Since that time China has periodically sent warships into the South China Sea with clear indications of a willingness to participate in gunboat diplomacy. China appears to be holding all of the cards despite the fact that Vietnam has received support and technical aid from the United States, Norway, and others who have a significant interest in petroleum exploration and development. By sheer military power, China could evict all other claimants from the area. If the issue were presented in the World Court, it appears that there is ample evidence to support China's claim on earliest human settlements and occupation.
The South China Sea also holds potentially lucrative fishing resources. It is an area through which Chêng Ho undoubtedly sailed by many times. While the Chinese did not believe in formally establishing colonies, the evidence shows that Chinese fishermen and farmers did try to eke out a living on some of the larger islands for longer than anyone can remember. For now, it seems that China is biding her time and is prepared to take whatever action is necessary when the moment is right. This, after all, is part of the Celestial Empire. It is part of China's destiny under heaven in being self-sufficient. And like Hong Kong or Taiwan, one day China will get it all back. In the meantime, soldiers are frantically occupying rocks, enlarging "islands," and trying to establish a sustainable environment in order to meet the perceived requirements of the Law of the Sea. The claim to a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone around each rock appears to be worth the risks.
To complicate matters, there is growing international concern for environmental issues. Growing population pressures in the region are resulting in overfishing and destructive fishing practices. In early 1998 marine research reports from the South China Sea showed that Chinese (Taiwan) and Hong Kong fisherman were using acid and explosives as part of their harvesting techniques. Some 600 Taiwanese boats and 400 Hong Kong boats fish within the Taiwan-controlled EEZ. Spraying acid on the water stuns fish so they can be captured alive. Live fish command higher prices and are much preferred in Chinese markets. However, use of acid kills the coral habitat of an area. Use of explosives, usually dynamite, both stuns and kills fish in a wide area making them easy to collect. Explosives also break and heavily damage coral reefs. The primary area being affected is in the Tungsha Tao (Pratas Island) area, approximately 200 nautical miles southwest of Taiwan. As much as 90 percent of the coral in this region has died. Compared with the area covered by the Spratlys, Tungsha Tao is very small. Yet it serves as an example of what can happen throughout the entire region of the western tropical Pacific. With few, if any, governmental controls these practices are already widespread. All governments and people should apply Elizabeth Borgese's view of stewardship of the sea to not only the "mines of Neptune" but also to the "gifts of Neptune." If this is not done, all signs point toward the fact that the living resources of the South China Sea may be doomed. Along with that are unforeseen global and international consequences.
Acharya, Anjali, "Small Islands: Awash in a Sea of Troubles," World Watch, Vol. 8, No. 6, November/December 1995. p. 24-33.
Associated Press, "Acid, Dynamite Destroying Coral." Hawaii Tribune-Herald, May 6, 1998.
Bao-tian, Li, "The Physical Conditions and the Development of the Nansha Islands." Paper presented at the 1994 AAG Annual Meeting. (Li Bao-tian represented the Institute of Geography, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, People's Republic of China).
Barraclough, Geoffrey, The Times Atlas of World History. Maplewood, NJ: Hammond Incorporated, 1979.
Boorstin, Daniel J., The Discoverers. New York: Random House, 1983.
Couper, Alastair, ed., The Times Atlas of the Oceans. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1983.
Cutler, B.J., "China's the Waterfront Bully of the Spratly Islands." The Sacramento Bee. July 27, 1994, B1.
De-xiang, Zhu, "The Geographical Discovery of the Nansha Islands." Paper presented at the 1994 AAG Annual Meeting. (Zhu De-xiang represented the Institute of Geography, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, People's Republic of China).
Geographica, "Lonely Rocks Important to Japan," National Geographic Magazine, November, 1988 (Vol. 174, No. 5).
Glassner, Martin Ira, and Harm J. de Blij, Systematic Political Geography, 4th ed.. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1989.
Ngok, Lee, "Taming the Dragon: Prospects for Genuine Cooperation in the South China Sea." Paper presented at the 1995 AAG Annual Meeting. ( Professor Lee Ngok is the Director of the School of Professional and Continuing Education at the University of Hong Kong).
Sea Power: A Global Journey, "Who Owns the Oceans," Program 5. New York: Ambrose Video Publishing, Inc., 1994.

